In the decision of 19 December 19973 challenged in the present case, the Court of Appeal annulled that of the Court of First Instance and confirmed the gift in question, namely: as in silim, the three (3) leases concluded herein by the beneficiary served exclusively to pursue the purpose for which the donation was intended. In fact, such a lease was approved by the donor by an express provision in the deed of gift, although the prior written consent of the donor is required for this. In view of the fact that the buyer`s actions did not divert attention from the actual purpose for which the donation was made, but precisely to achieve that purpose, the absence of the donor`s prior written consent would only constitute an accidental violation of the document that would not justify the revocation of the donation. On the 24th. In September 1977, the applicant donated to the defendant land in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna with an area of 41,117 square metres, in his name under the number of Certificate of Transfer of Title (TCT) No. T-82803. The deed of gift, which also implies the acceptance of the beneficiary, contains the consideration provided for this purpose and the conditions attached to it, i.e. the court cannot consider the requirement of prior written consent of the donor for all lease agreements to be concluded by the recipient as an absolute reason for the revocation of the gift, for such a condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the gift, would constitute an unreasonable restriction of the beneficiary`s right to ownership of the donated property. On the one hand, the violations of the conditions of the gift committed by the recipient constituted only fortuitous violations of the conditions of the gift and did not diminish the purpose for which the donation was made, namely the establishment of a home for the elderly and frail. A contract which imposes a mutual obligation, namely the incriminating gift in the present case, in which the donor is obliged to donate land of 41,117 square metres in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna, on whose property the beneficiary is obliged to build a house for the elderly and frail (Annex C), may be revoked in accordance with Article 1191 of the new Civil Code.
the breach of the conditions must be material in order to frustrate the purpose for which the treaty was perfected (Tolentino, “Civil Code of the Philippines”, vol. IV, pp. 179-180; Universal Food Corp.c. Court of Appeal, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v. Court of Appeal, 233 SCRA 551, 562). In the case of “Ocampo v.C.A.” (ibid.), citing “Angeles v. Calasanz” (135 SCRA 323, 330), the Supreme Court ruled: Donation as a method of acquiring property entails an effective transfer of ownership of the property from the donor to the recipient. Once a gift has been accepted, the beneficiary becomes the absolute owner of the donated property. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the act of giving, this must not violate the law, morality, morality, public order and public order. and requested accordingly that the deed of gift in question be revoked and declared void and that the beneficiary be invited to return and/or return the donated property.
In Silim, loc. cit. O., the court ruled that such an exchange does not constitute a violation of the terms of the gift. We see no reason for the Court to think differently in this case. Insisting that the home for the elderly and infirm be built on the given property when industrialization really penetrates contradicts the rhyme and reason. Any action by the donor to prevent the recipient from ultimately achieving the purpose for which the donation was intended would constitute bad faith, which the court will not tolerate. After that, or somewhere in 1980, the beneficiary leased part of the donated land to generate funds for the construction of the fence fence on the given property and the construction of a basic building for the elderly and frail to a Martin Gomez, who planted this part with sugar cane. There is no doubt that the lease was entered into by the beneficiary without the prior written consent of the donor, as required by the deed of gift. The lease to Gomez ended in 1985.
Decision1 of 19 December 1997 and Order2 of 30 April 1998 of the Court of Appeal in ca-G.R. CV No. 45392, annulment of an earlier decision of the Regional Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, branch 34, which ruled in favour of the applicant C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., living herein, in a legal action for revocation of the gift with retransfer of property initiated by the applicant against the defendant here, the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. In its response, the respondent asserted that it was doing its best to comply with the provisions of the deed of gift concerning the construction of the home for the elderly and infirm, adding that the leases of parts of the land had been concluded with the express, albeit unwritten, consent of Jesus Miguel Yulo himself. In the same reply, the defendant argued that the possible ground for revocation of the donor had already been prescribed because the donor had been aware of the leases since 1980. ARTICLE 733 The provisions of the Contract shall apply to gifts for pecuniary interest and, in the case of gifts for consideration, the provisions of this Title shall apply to the part exceeding the value of the charge imposed. The above-mentioned judgment of the Court of Appeal is entirely consistent with that Court`s decision in Republic v. Silim, loc. cit.
The donor attempted to revoke the gift on the grounds that the receiver violated the condition of using the land exclusively and forever only for school purposes, but that court ruled in the receiver`s favour: even then, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the Court of First Instance, the reversal being based on the Court of Appeal`s finding that the offences committed by the defendant on three occasions were only accidental violations, which, however, did not divert attention from the decision of the first instance. the purpose for which the donation was made: the creation of a home for the elderly and infirmity. For that reason, the decision of the Court of First Instance of 22 December 1993 is set aside and the gift of 24 September 1977 (Annex C) which transferred ownership of the property donated to the applicant`s name is CONFIRMED. If the applicant insisted that the absence of prior written consent is a condition of confirmation of an absolute nature, the insistence would not stand up to the criterion of validity laid down in the above-mentioned doctrine […].
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